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Abstract—Modern processors are increasingly featuring
multiple cores, as well as support for hardware virtual-
ization. While these processors are common in desktop
and server-class computing, they are less prevalent in
embedded and real-time systems. However, smartphones
and tablet PCs are starting to feature multicore processors
with hardware virtualization. If the trend continues, it is
possible that future real-time systems will feature more
sophisticated processor architectures. Future automotive
or avionics systems, for example, could replace complex
networks of uniprocessors with consolidated services on a
smaller number of multicore processors. Likewise, virtual-
ization could be used to isolate services and increase the
availability of a system even when failures occur.
This paper investigates whether advances in modern
processor technologies offer new opportunities to rethink
the design of real-time operating systems. We describe some
of the design principles behind Quest-V, which is being
used as an exploratory vehicle for real-time system design
on multicore processors with hardware virtualization ca-
pabilities. While not all embedded systems should assume
such features, a case can be made that more robust, safety-
critical systems can be built to use hardware virtualization
without incurring significant overheads.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multicore processors are becoming ubiquitous in all
classes of computing, from desktops to servers, and even
embedded systems. Many of these processors also sup-
port hardware virtualization capabilities. For example,
Intel VT-x, AMD-V, and more recently, ARM Cortex
A15 processors all have native machine virtualization
support. While many such processors have been used in
virtual datacenters, there is an opportunity to consider
multicore virtualized systems in new areas of embedded
computing. The ARM Cortex A15, for example, is being
targeted at tablet devices and smartphones, with the abil-
ity to support multiple guest environments that separate
personal and work-related information and services.
This paper investigates whether advances in modern
processor technologies offer new opportunities to rethink
the design of safety-critical real-time operating systems
(RTOSes). We present a new system design that uses
both virtualization capabilities and the redundancy of-
fered by multiple processing cores, to develop a real-time
system that is resilient to software faults. Our system,
called Quest-V [1], is designed as a multikernel [2], or
distributed system on a chip. It encapsulates different
kernel instances, and their applications, in separate vir-
tual machines (VMs). Faults in one VM are isolated from
other VMs, similar to how processes are isolated from
one another in a traditional operating system. However,
each VM has greater capabilities than a traditional pro-
cess running on top of a more privileged OS kernel. With
Quest-V, each kernel instance in its own VM runs on top
of a privileged monitor. While a monitor is required to
be trusted, it can be kept to a minimal size and removed
from the normal execution path of each kernel in the
system.
Quest-V is not intended to replace RTOSes found in
relatively simplistic closed embedded systems, with fixed
tasksets and highly deterministic behavior. Instead, it is
targeted at open real-time systems with dynamic tasksets
and potentially unpredictable operating environments.
Such systems often feature a mix of real-time and best-
effort tasks, and data inputs generated by potentially
untrusted external sources. Safety and security become
significant, particularly in application domains such as
health-care, factory automation, avionics and automotive
systems. As an example, a future automotive system
may not only involve internal tasks communicating over
a controller area network, but may include dynamic
tasks and data from interaction with other vehicles
or the surroundings. External factors have significant
consequences on the safe and timely operation of the
vehicle [3].
While Linux supports hardware virtualization through
its KVM interface, and hypervisors such as Xen [4] exist,
neither approach has focused on providing real-time
guarantees to tasks with safety and security constraints.
Quest-V is an investigation into whether a single system
can be built from a collection of separate kernel images
operating together, to satisfy both temporal and spatial
isolation requirements. Temporally, one task should not
interfere with another in its timing requirements, while
spatially, the misuse of resources such as memory by
one task should not affect others.
We show how Quest-V does not incur significant
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operational overheads compared to a non-virtualized
version of our system, simply called Quest, designed for
SMP platforms. We describe how to enforce real-time
guarantees on communication, interrupt handling, thread
scheduling, and cross-core task migration. Similarly, we
show how to leverage virtualization to prevent software
component failures (either through error or malicious
attacks) from compromising an entire system.
In the following section we describe the rationale for
the design of Quest-V. This is followed by a descrip-
tion of the architecture in Section III. An experimental
evaluation of the system is provided in Section IV.
Here, we show the overheads of online fault recovery,
along with the costs of using hardware virtualization
to isolate kernels and system components. Section V
describes related work, while conclusions are discussed
in Section VI.
II. DESIGN RATIONALE
Quest-V is centered around three main goals: safety,
predictability and efficiency. The system is focused
on safety-critical application domains, requiring high
confidence in their operation [5] to prevent potential
loss of lives or equipment. With recent advances in
fields such as cyber-physical systems, more sophisticated
OSes beyond those traditionally found in real-time and
embedded computing are now required. Consider, for
example, a collection of automotive sub-systems for
engine, body, chassis, transmission, safety and info-
tainment services. These could be consolidated on the
same multicore platform, with space-time partitioning to
ensure malfunctions do not propagate across services.
Moreover, if future automotive systems interact with
their environments as part of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
or vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication, they
are open to potential safety and security breaches from
external sources.
While safety is a key goal, hardware virtualization
provides a method to encapsulate, or sandbox, system
resources from access by unauthorized sources. Virtual-
ization provides an opportunity to enforce both system-
wide safety and security beyond that achievable with
non-virtualized hardware solutions such as paging and
segmentation [6], [7]. Quest-V relies on Extended Page
Tables (EPTs) 1 to separate system software components
operating as a collection of services in a distributed sys-
tem on a chip. The rationale for a virtualized multikernel
is as follows:
(1) Efficiency and Improved Predictability – a mul-
tikernel adheres to the share-nothing principle, first
1Intel uses the term “EPT”, while AMD refers to them as Nested
Page Tables (NPTs). We use the term EPT for consistency.
discussed in the work on Barrelfish [2]. This leads to
reduced resource contention and improved system effi-
ciency on platforms with multiple cores, even accounting
for explicit inter-kernel communication costs. As system
resources are effectively distributed across cores, and
each core is managed separately, there is no need to
have shared structures such as a global scheduler queue.
This, in turn, can improve predictability by eliminating
undue blocking delays due to synchronization.
(2) Fault Resilience – replication of kernel function-
ality or, at least, separation of services in different
protection domains increases fault resilience. This, in
turn, increases system availability when there are partial
system failures.
(3) Highest Safe Privilege – Rather than adopting a
principle of least privilege for software services, as is
done in micro-kernels, a virtualized system can support
the highest safe privilege levels for different services.
Virtualization provides an extra logical ”ring of pro-
tection” that allows guests to think they are working
directly on the hardware. Thus, virtualized services can
be written with traditional kernel privileges, yet still be
isolated from other equally privileged services in other
guest domains. This avoids the costs typically associated
with micro-kernels, which require added communication
overheads to request services in different protection
domains.
(4) Minimal Trusted Code Base – A micro-kernel
attempts to provide a minimal trusted code base for the
services it supports. However, it must still be accessed
as part of inter-process communication, and basic op-
erations such as coarse-grained memory management.
Monitors form a trusted code base in the Quest-V virtual-
ized multikernel. Access to these can be avoided almost
entirely, except to bootstrap (guest) sandbox kernels,
handle faults and manage EPTs. This enables sandboxes
to operate, for the most part, independently of any other
code base that requires trust. In turn, the trusted code
base (i.e., monitors) can be limited to a small memory
footprint.
While Quest-V uses hardware virtualization to iso-
late sandbox kernels, this is not a requirement of our
multikernel approach. Many platforms, especially those
in embedded systems, still lack hardware virtualization
features. In such cases, it is possible to use alternative
memory protection schemes based on segmentation or
paging, for example. In this work, we seek to investigate
the costs, and feasibility, of using hardware virtualization
as a first-class feature of a chip-level distributed system.
This contrasts with past work on virtual machines that
treat guests as mostly separate and unrelated entities.
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III. QUEST-V ARCHITECTURE
A high-level overview of the Quest-V architecture is
shown in Figure 1. Each sandbox encapsulates a subset
of machine physical resources (i.e., memory, one or more
CPU cores and I/O devices), along with a kernel instance
and its applications. A single hypervisor is replaced by a
separate trusted monitor for each sandbox. This prevents
a monitor from having to switch EPT mappings on
return from handling VM-Exits 2, since the same guest,
or sandbox kernel, will always resume. Additionally,
separate monitors can be implemented differently, to
prevent vulnerabilities to the same security threat.
Each monitor occupies less than a 4KB memory page.
Apart from establishing EPT memory mappings 3 for
sandboxes and communication channels, and assisting
in fault recovery and migration, the monitors are not
needed. Each sandbox kernel performs its own local
scheduling and I/O handling without the cost of VM-
Exits into a monitor. This is a significant departure from
traditional virtual machine (VM) systems, which require
the hypervisor to schedule guest VMs and manage I/O.
Fig. 1. Quest-V Architecture Overview
The extent to which functionality is separated across
kernels is somewhat configurable in the Quest-V design.
In our initial implementation, each sandbox kernel repli-
cates most functionality, offering a private version of the
corresponding services to its local application threads. It
is, however, possible to have some kernels run Quest
real-time services, while others run alternative kernels
based on Linux or Autosar, for example.
Quest-V allows any sandbox to be configured for
corresponding device interrupts, rather than having a
dedicated sandbox for all communication with that de-
vice. This greatly reduces the communication and control
paths necessary for I/O requests from applications in
2E.g., due to an EPT violation caused by a fault.
3The page tables for EPTs take additional space but a 12KB mapping
is enough for a 1GB sandbox.
Quest-V. It also differs from the split-driver approach
in systems such as Xen, which require all device inter-
rupts to be channeled through a special driver domain.
Sandboxes can be isolated from unnecessary drivers and
services. Likewise, a sandbox can be provided with its
own private set of devices and drivers, so if a software
failure occurs in one driver, it will not affect all other
sandboxes.
Quest-V allows each sandbox kernel to be configured
to operate on a chosen subset of CPUs, or cores. This
is similar to how Corey partitions resources amongst
applications [8]. In our current approach, we assume
each sandbox kernel is associated with one physical
core since that simplifies local (sandbox) scheduling and
allows for relatively easy enforcement of service guar-
antees using a variant of rate-monotonic scheduling [9].
Notwithstanding, application threads can be migrated
between sandboxes as part of a load balancing strategy.
Similarly, multi-threaded applications can be distributed
across sandboxes to allow parallel thread execution.
Application and system services in distinct sandbox
kernels can communicate via shared memory channels.
Channels are established by EPT mappings setup by
the corresponding monitors. Messages are passed across
these channels similar to the approach in Barrelfish [2].
While a shared communication channel can be corrupted
by a sandbox failure, EPTs prevent corruption of private
memory regions in a remote sandbox. All other remote
sandboxes with separate communication channels can
continue to operate without compromise.
Main and I/O virtual CPUs (VCPUs) are used for real-
time management of CPU cycles, to enforce temporal
isolation. Application and system threads are bound to
VCPUs, which in turn are assigned to underlying phys-
ical CPUs. We will discuss this further in the following
section.
A. System Implementation
Quest-V has been implemented from scratch as a 32-
bit x86 system. Plans are underway to port the system to
ARM Cortex A15 processors that also support hardware
virtualization. The kernel code is approximately 10,000
lines of C and assembly, discounting drivers and network
stack [10]. Using EPTs, each sandbox virtual address
space is mapped to its own host memory region. By
default, only the BIOS is shared across sandboxes,
while all other functionality is privately mapped. EPT
mappings can be established for shared communication
channels between pairwise groups of sandboxes. Access
from one sandbox into another sandbox’s memory space
is still, however, restricted to the pages of memory
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within this shared channel. Once bootstrapped, a Quest-
V sandbox kernel can operate as a bootloader for a
third-party system (e.g., a Linux or Autosar guest). This
allows inter-operation between different sub-systems co-
existing on the same hardware.
Hardware-Assisted Memory Isolation. Figure 2
shows how address translation works for Quest-V guests
(i.e., sandboxes) using Intel’s extended page tables. Each
sandbox kernel uses its own internal paging structures
to translate guest virtual addresses to guest physical
addresses (GPAs). EPT structures are then walked by
the hardware to complete the translation to host physical
addresses (HPAs). Modern processors with hardware
support (e.g., Intel VT-x processors) avoid the need for
software managed shadow page tables, and they also
support TLBs to cache various intermediate translation
stages. This greatly reduces the cost of address transla-
tion, as will be seen in Section IV-A.
Fig. 2. Extended Page Table Mapping
On VT-x processors, address mappings can be ma-
nipulated at 4KB page granularity. For each 4KB page
we have the ability to set read, write and even execute
permissions. Consequently, attempts by one sandbox to
access illegitimate memory regions of another will incur
an EPT violation, causing a trap to the local monitor.
The EPT data structures are, themselves, restricted to
access by the monitors, thereby preventing tampering by
sandbox kernels.
EPT support alone is actually insufficient to prevent
faulty device drivers from corrupting the system. It is still
possible for a malicious driver or a faulty device to DMA
into arbitrary physical memory. This can be prevented
with technologies such as Intel’s VT-d, which restrict
the regions into which DMAs can occur using IOM-
MUs. However, this is still insufficient to address other
more insidious security vulnerabilities such as “white
rabbit” attacks [11]. For example, a PCIe device can
be configured to generate a Message Signaled Interrupt
(MSI) with arbitrary vector and delivery mode by writing
to Local APIC memory. Such malicious attacks can be
addressed using hardware techniques such as Interrupt
Remapping (IR), which restrict both the source and
destination of interrupts.
Real-Time VCPU Scheduling. For use in real-time
systems, the system must perform certain tasks by their
deadlines. Quest-V does not require tasks to specify
deadlines but instead ensures that the execution of one
task does not interfere with the timely execution of oth-
ers. For example, Quest-V is capable of scheduling inter-
rupt handlers as threads, so they do not unduly interfere
with the execution of higher-priority tasks. While Quest-
V’s scheduling framework is described elsewhere [12],
we briefly explain how it provides temporal isolation
between tasks and system events.
In Quest-V, VCPUs form the fundamental abstraction
for scheduling and temporal isolation of the system. The
concept of a VCPU is similar to that in virtual ma-
chines [13], [4], where a hypervisor provides the illusion
of multiple physical CPUs (PCPUs) 4 represented as
VCPUs to each of the guest virtual machines. VCPUs
exist as kernel (as opposed to monitor) abstractions,
to simplify the management of resource budgets for
potentially many software threads. We use a hierarchical
approach in which VCPUs are scheduled on PCPUs and
threads are scheduled on VCPUs.
A VCPU acts as a resource container [14] for schedul-
ing and accounting decisions on behalf of software
threads. It serves no other purpose to virtualize the
underlying physical CPUs, since our sandbox kernels
and their applications execute directly on the hardware.
In particular, a VCPU does not need to act as a container
for cached instruction blocks that have been generated
to emulate the effects of guest code, as in some trap-
and-emulate virtualized systems.
In common with bandwidth preserving servers [15],
[16], [17], each VCPU, V , has a maximum compute
time budget, CV , available in a time period, TV . V is
constrained to use no more than the fraction UV =
C
T
of
a physical processor (PCPU) in any window of real-time,
TV , while running at its normal (foreground) priority. To
avoid situations where PCPUs are idle when there are
threads awaiting service, a VCPU that has expired its
budget may operate at a lower (background) priority. All
background priorities are set below those of foreground
priorities to ensure VCPUs with expired budgets do not
adversely affect those with available budgets.
4We define a PCPU to be either a conventional CPU, a processing
core, or a hardware thread.
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Fig. 3. VCPU Scheduling Hierarchy
Quest-V defines two classes of VCPUs as shown in
Figure 3: (1)Main VCPUs are used to schedule and track
the PCPU usage of conventional software threads, while
(2) I/O VCPUs are used to account for, and schedule
the execution of, interrupt handlers for I/O devices. This
distinction allows for interrupts from I/O devices to be
scheduled as threads, which may be deferred execution
when threads associated with higher priority VCPUs
having available budgets are runnable. The flexibility of
Quest-V allows I/O VCPUs to be specified for certain de-
vices, or for certain tasks that issue I/O requests, thereby
allowing interrupts to be handled at different priorities
and with different CPU shares than conventional tasks
associated with Main VCPUs.
By default, each Main VCPU acts like a Sporadic
Server [18], [19], while each I/O VCPU acts as a band-
width preserving server with a dynamically-calculated
period, TIO, and budget, CIO [12]. Each I/O VCPU is
specified a certain utilization factor, UIO, to limit its
bandwidth. When a device interrupt requires handling
by an I/O VCPU, the system determines the thread τ
associated with a corresponding I/O request 5. In Quest-
V, all events including those related to I/O processing are
associated with threads running on Main VCPUs. CIO
is calculated as TV ·UIO, while TIO is set to TV for a
Main VCPU, V , associated with τ .
Figure 4 shows an example schedule for two Main
VCPUs and one I/O VCPU, with a utilization factor of
4, for a certain device such as a gigabit Ethernet card.
Replenishment lists are shown for VCPU1. Since the I/O
VCPU handles I/O requests on behalf of a thread running
on VCPU1, it inherits a budget, CIO = 50 ∗ 0.04, and
period, TIO = 50.
The invariant is that the sum of replenishment amounts
for all list items must not exceed the budget capacity of
the corresponding VCPU (here, 20, for VCPU1). Also,
no future replenishment, R, for a VCPU, V , executing
from t to t+R can occur before t+ TV [19].
5E.g., τ may have issued a prior read() request that caused it
to block on its Main VCPU, but which ultimately led to a device
performing an I/O operation.
Temporal Isolation. In Quest-V, VCPUs are mapped
to a separate scheduling queue for each PCPU. Under
this arrangement, our default policies for Main and I/O
VCPU scheduling allow us to guarantee temporal isola-
tion if the Liu-Layland utilization bound is satisfied [9].
For a single PCPU with n Main VCPUs and m I/O
VCPUs we have the following:
n1
=

T
+
m1
j=
2− Uj)∙Uj ≤ n
“
n
√
2− 1
”
(1)
Here, Ci and Ti are the budget capacity and period
of Main VCPU Vi, and Uj is the utilization factor of
I/O VCPU Vj . Further details are available outside this
paper [12]. This bound can be improved with dynamic
priority scheduling of VCPUs (e.g., using earliest dead-
line first scheduling) but this adds more overhead to the
scheduler. This is because: (1) dynamic priorities require
more complex queue management, and (2) Quest-V uses
Local APIC timers, programmed for one-shot operation,
to trigger an interrupt in time for the next event to be
processed; more frequent reprogramming of timers may
be necessary if priorities change.
Quest-V admission control uses Equation 1 to decide
whether to allow the creation of a new VCPU. In
overload conditions, static priority scheduling has the
advantage that the highest priority subset of VCPUs
capable of meeting their timing requirements will not
be affected by lower priority VCPUs. This is not the
case with dynamic priority scheduling, where overload
can cause all VCPUs to fail to maintain their correct
PCPU shares. Similarly, hypervisor scheduling using
policies such as Borrowed Virtual Time (BVT) [20]
cannot guarantee temporal isolation between VCPUs
over specific real-time windows.
Real-Time Communication. Inter-sandbox commu-
nication in Quest-V relies on message passing primi-
tives built on shared memory, and asynchronous event
notification mechanisms using Inter-processor Interrupts
(IPIs). IPIs are currently used to communicate with
remote sandboxes to assist in fault recovery, and can
also be used to notify the arrival of messages exchanged
via shared memory channels. Monitors update extended
page table mappings as necessary to establish message
passing channels between specific sandboxes. Only those
sandboxes with mapped shared pages are able to com-
municate with one another.
A mailbox data structure is set up within shared mem-
ory by each end of a communication channel. By default,
Quest-V currently supports asynchronous communica-
tion by polling a status bit in each relevant mailbox to
determine message arrival. Message passing threads are
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Fig. 4. Example VCPU Schedule
bound to VCPUs with specific parameters to control the
rate of exchange of information. Likewise, sending and
receiving threads are assigned to higher priority VCPUs
to reduce the latency of transfer of information across
a communication channel. This way, shared memory
channels can be prioritized and granted higher or lower
throughput as needed, while ensuring information is
communicated in a predictable manner. Thus, Quest-
V supports real-time communication between sandboxes
without compromising the CPU shares allocated to non-
communicating tasks.
Predictable Migration. Quest-V restricts migratable
address spaces to those associated with VCPUs that
either: (1) have currently expired budgets, or (2) are
waiting in a sleep queue. In the former case, the VCPU
is not runnable at its foreground priority until its next
budget replenishment. In the latter case, a VCPU is
blocked until a wakeup event occurs (e.g., due to an I/O
request completion or a resource becoming available).
Together, these two cases prevent migrating a VCPU
when it is runnable, as the migration delay could impact
the VCPU’s utilization.
For VCPU, Vs, associated with a migrating address
space, we define Es to be the relative time
6 of the next
event, which is either a replenishment or wakeup. For
the utilization of Vs to be unaffected by migration, the
following must hold:
Es ≥ 
Δs
Cm
 · Tm +Δs mod Cm (2)
where Cm and Tm are the budget and period of
the migrating thread’s VCPU, and Δs is the migration
cost of copying an address space and its quest tss
data structures to the destination. At boot time, Quest-V
establishes base costs for copying memory pages without
caches enabled 7. These costs are used to determine
Δs for a given address space size. Quest-V makes sure
that the migrating thread will not be woken up by
6i.e., Relative to current time.
7We do not consider memory bus contention issues, which could
make worst-case estimations even larger.
asynchronous events until the migration is finished. The
system imposes the restriction that threads waiting on
I/O events cannot be migrated.
A schedulability test is performed before migration, to
ensure a VCPU can be added to the destination sandbox
without affecting total utilization. If the test fails, the
migration request will be rejected immediately by an IPI.
A VCPU can be migrated immediately for any successful
test, if it does not require its utilization to be guaranteed
while migration is in progress.
In order to simplify the migration criteria, our current
implementation restricts concurrent migration requests to
different destination sandboxes. This is not problematic
as migrations are expected to be infrequent.
Clock Synchronization. One extra challenge to be
considered during migration is clock synchronization
between different sandboxes. Quest-V schedulers use
Local APIC Timers and Time Stamp Counters (TSCs)
in each core as the source for all time-related activities
in the system, and these are not guaranteed to be syn-
chronized by hardware. Consequently, Quest-V adjusts
time for each migrating address space to compensate
for clock skew. This is necessary when updating budget
replenishment and wakeup time events for a migrating
VCPU that is sleeping on an I/O request, or which is not
yet runnable.
The source sandbox places its current TSC value
in shared memory immediately before sending an IPI
migration request. This value is compared with the desti-
nation TSC when the IPI is received. A time-adjustment,
δ
DJ , for the migrating VCPU is calculated as follows:
δ
DJ = TSCd−TSCs−2∗RDTSCcost−IPIcost (3)
TSCd and TSCs are the destination and source TSCs,
while RDTSCcost and IPIcost are the average costs of
reading a TSC and sending an IPI, respectively. δ
DJ
is then added to all future budget replenishment and
wakeup time events for the migrating VCPU in the
destination sandbox.
Interrupt Distribution and I/O Management. By
default, Quest-V allows interrupts to be delivered di-
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rectly to sandbox kernels. Hardware interrupts are de-
livered to all sandbox kernels with access to the cor-
responding device. This avoids the need for interrupt
handling to be performed in the context of a monitor
as is typically done with conventional virtual machine
approaches. Experiments show that virtualization does
not add significant overheads for handling interrupts or
I/O requests. See Section VII-C in the Appendix for
further details.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We conducted a series of experiments to investigate
the performance, predictability and fault isolation of
Quest-V. For network experiments, we ran Quest-V
on a mini-ITX machine with a Core i5-2500K 4-core
processor, featuring 8GB RAM and a Realtek 8111e
NIC. In all other cases we used a Dell PowerEdge T410
server with an Intel Xeon E5506 2.13GHz 4-core pro-
cessor, featuring 4GB RAM. Unless otherwise stated, all
software threads were bound to Main VCPUs with 100%
total utilization for performance related experiments.
A. Address Translation Overhead
To show the costs of address translation as described
in Figure 2, we measured the latency to access a number
of data and instruction pages in a guest user-space
process. Figures 5 and 6 show the execution time
of a process bound to a Main VCPU with a 20ms
budget every 100ms. Instruction and data references to
consecutive pages are 4160 bytes apart to avoid cache
aliasing effects. The results show the average cost to
access working sets taken over 10 million iterations. In
the cases where there is a TLB flush or a VM exit, these
are performed each time the set of pages on the x-axis
has been referenced.
For working sets less than 512 pages Quest-V (Base
case) performs as well as a non-virtualized version of
Quest. Extra levels of address translation with extended
paging only incur costs above the two-level paging of a
32-bit Quest virtual memory system when address spaces
are larger than 512 pages. For embedded systems, we
do not see this as a limitation, as most applications will
have smaller working sets. As can be seen, the costs of
a VM-Exit are equivalent to a TLB flush, but Quest-
V avoids this by operating more in common with the
Quest-V Base case. Hence, extended paging does not
incur significant overheads under normal circumstances,
as the hardware TLBs are being used effectively.
B. Fault Isolation and Predictability
To demonstrate fault isolation in Quest-V, we created a
scenario that includes both message passing and network
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service across 4 different sandboxes. Specifically, sand-
box 1 has a kernel thread that sends messages through
private message passing channels to sandbox 0, 2 and
3. Each private channel is shared only between the
sender and specific receiver, and is guarded by EPTs. In
addition, sandbox 0 also has a network service running
that handles ICMP echo requests. After all the services
are up and running, we manually break the NIC driver
in sandbox 0, overwrite sandbox 0’s message passing
channel shared with sandbox 1, and try to corrupt the
kernel memory of other sandboxes to simulate a driver
fault. After the driver fault, sandbox 0 will try to recover
the NIC driver along with both network and message
passing services running in it. During the recovery, the
whole system activity is plotted in terms of message
reception rate and ICMP echo reply rate in all available
sandboxes and the results are shown in Figure 7.
In the experiment, sandbox 1 broadcasts messages
to others at 50 millisecond intervals, while sandbox
0, 2 and 3 receive at 100, 800 and 1000 millisecond
intervals. Also, another machine in the local network
sends ICMP echo requests at 500 millisecond intervals
to sandbox 0. All message passing threads are bound to
Main VCPUs with 100ms periods and 20% utilization.
The network driver thread is bound to an I/O VCPU with
10% utilization and 10ms period.
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Fig. 7. Sandbox Isolation
Results show that an interruption of service happened
for both message passing and network packet processing
in sandbox 0, but all the other sandboxes were unaf-
fected. This is because of memory isolation between
sandboxes enforced by EPTs.
Finally, we ran an experiment using the TORCS
driving simulator [21]. The AI engine for a self-driving
car was first run in a Quest-V sandbox and then in an
Ubuntu Linux 10.04 guest on Xen 4.1.3. In each case, we
simulated a fault that either affected an entire Quest-V
sandbox or Linux kernel. A “hot standby” version of the
AI engine also ran in a separate sandbox or, for Linux, a
different guest. Fault recovery triggered the hot standby,
which ran in a domain with a CPU hog attempting
to consume as much time as possible. For Linux, the
hog prevented the hot standby running as desired. For
Quest-V, the hog was restricted to a VCPU that allowed
the AI engine to acquire 2ms every 5ms of CPU time.
Consequently, Figure 8 shows the car was able to drive
smoothly around the track without the effects of faulting
services or competition for CPU resources in Quest-V.
For Linux on Xen, the vehicle’s trajectory was affected
as shown in the right-most figure. Other scenarios, not
shown, led to the Linux AI engine suffering enough
delay to cause the vehicle to crash.
Fig. 8. TORCS: Quest-V (left) and Linux-Xen (right)
The lack of real-time predictability in Linux means
there is no temporal isolation between a CPU hogging
thread and the AI engine. Similarly, the underlying
hypervisor is also not able to guarantee real-time CPU
shares to its Linux guests. These factors cause the
vehicle’s trajectory to be affected when a system fault
occurs. Moreover, the Linux guests are not running on
a hypervisor that is aware they are cooperating in fault
recovery. Consequently, the TORCS AI engine and the
hot standbys must be written in a way to be aware of each
others existence. Minimally, this requires filtering of the
hot standby’s messages exchanged with the server when
the primary AI engine is operational. In contrast, the
Quest-V driver layer can be configured to filter data from
hot standbys until they are needed in fault recovery. This
means applications do not have to be written explicitly
to coordinate with fault recovery processes.
C. Predictable Migration and Communication
To verify the predictability of the Quest-V migration
framework, we constructed a task group consisting of
2 communicating threads and another CPU-intensive
thread running a Canny edge detection algorithm on a
stream of video frames. The frames were gathered from
a LogiTech QuickCam Pro9000 camera mounted on our
RacerX mobile robot, which traversed one lap of Boston
University’s indoor running track at Agganis Arena 8. To
avoid variable bit rate frames affecting the results of our
experiments, we applied Canny repeatedly to the frame
shown in Figure 9 rather than a live stream of the track.
This way, we could determine the effects of migration on
a Canny thread by observing changes in processing rate
while the other threads communicated with each other.
Fig. 9. Track Image Processed by Canny
For all the experiments in this section, we have two
active sandbox kernels each with 5 VCPUs. The setup
is shown in Table I. The Canny thread is the target for
migration from sandbox 1 to sandbox 2 in all cases. Mi-
gration always starts at time 5. A logger thread was used
to collect the result of the experiment in a predictable
manner. Data points are sampled and reported in a one
second interval.
Figure 10 shows the behavior of Canny as it is mi-
grated in the presence of the two communicating threads.
The left y-axis shows both Canny frame rate (in frames-
per-second, fps) and message passing throughput (in
8RacerX is a real-time robot control project that leverages Quest-V.
8
VCPU (C/T) Sandbox 1 Sandbox 2
20/100 Shell Shell
10/50 Migration Thread Migration Thread
20/100 Canny
20/100 Logger Logger
10/100 Comms 1 Comms 2
TABLE I
MIGRATION EXPERIMENT VCPU SETUP
multiples of a 1000 Kilobytes-per-second). The right y-
axis shows the actual CPU consumption of the migration
thread in (millions of, x1m) cycles. We can see from
this figure that none of the threads (2 communicating
threads and Canny) have been affected due to migration.
The sudden spike in migration thread CPU consumption
occurs during the migration of the Canny thread.
The average time to migrate an address space varies
from under 1 millisecond to about 10 - 20 milliseconds,
depending on the actual address space size. This is with
all caches enabled and with address spaces being limited
to a maximum of 4MB.
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Fig. 10. Migration With No Added Overhead
Table II shows the values of variables as defined in
Equation 2. The worst-case migration cost, Δs worst,
was the cost of copying a Canny address space with
all caches disabled (including the overhead of walking
its page directory). Δs actual was the actual migra-
tion thread budget consumption during migration. Both
worst-case and actual migration costs satisfy the con-
straints of Equation 2, while considering Equation 3.
Consequently, all VCPUs remain unaffected in terms of
their CPU utilization during migration.
Variables Es ∆s worst ∆s actual Cm Tm
Time (ms) 79.8 5.4 1.7 10 50
TABLE II
MIGRATION CONDITION
V. RELATED WORK
Barrelfish[2] is a multikernel that replicates system
state rather than sharing it, to avoid the costs of syn-
chronization and management of shared data structures.
As with Quest-V, communication between kernels is via
explicit message passing, using shared memory channels
to transfer cache-line-sized messages. In contrast to
Barrelfish, Quest-V uses virtualization mechanisms to
isolate kernel services as part of our goal to develop
high-confidence systems.
Factored OS (FOS) [22] and Corey [8] are partitioning
systems that distribute OS services and applications
across processing cores. These systems are focused on
scalability rather than Quest-V’s primary focus on fault
isolation and predictability.
There have been several systems that rely on vir-
tualization techniques to enforce logical isolation and
implement scalable resource management on multicore
and multiprocessor platforms. Cellular Disco [23] ex-
tends the Disco virtual machine monitor (VMM) [24]
with support for hardware fault containment. As with
Hive [25], the system is partitioned into cells, each
containing a copy of the monitor code and all machine
memory pages belonging to the cell’s nodes. Failure of
one cell only affects VMs using resources in that cell.
Xen[4] is a subsequent VMM that uses a special
driver domain and (now optional) para-virtualization
techniques to support multiple guests. In contrast to
VMMs such as Disco, Xen and also the Wind River
Hypervisor [26], Quest-V operates as a single system
with sandbox kernels potentially implementing different
services that are isolated using memory virtualization.
Quest-V also avoids the need for a split-driver model
involving a special domain (e.g., Dom0 in Xen) to handle
device interrupts.
Finally, PikeOS [27] is a separation micro-kernel [28]
that supports multiple guest VMs, and targets safety-
critical domains such as Integrated Modular Avionics.
The micro-kernel supports a virtualization layer that is
required to manage the spatial and temporal partitioning
of resources amongst guests. This contrasts with Quest-
V, where each sandbox kernel is responsible for its own
local scheduling on a subset of processor cores – a
VMM, or hypervisor, is not required for scheduling.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes the Quest-V multikernel, de-
signed for real-time, safety-critical systems. Extended
page tables are used to isolate sandbox kernels across
different cores in a multicore system. Hardware virtual-
ization provides a fault containment mechanism via an
extra logical “ring of protection”. This enables untrusted
software to run with traditional kernel-level privileges,
without compromising the entire system. This contrasts
with the micro-kernel approach of providing the least
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privileges necessary to software, and using the kernel as
a trusted communication channel for interaction between
less trusted software components. Quest-V, for the most
part, eliminates the trusted component (here, a monitor)
from the critical path of software execution. Monitors
are only needed for fault handling, migration, and up-
dating EPT mappings (e.g., to establish communication
channels with other sandboxes).
Experiments show that hardware virtualization does
not add significant overheads in our design, as VM-
Exits into monitor code are not normally needed. Un-
like conventional hypervisors that virtualize underlying
hardware for use by multiple disparate guests, Quest-
V assumes all sandboxes are operating together as one
collective distributed system on a chip. Each sandbox
kernel is responsible for scheduling of its threads and
VCPUs onto local hardware cores. Local scheduling
within each sandbox involves the management of time
budgeted, temporally-isolated VCPUs. Similarly, mem-
ory allocation and I/O management are handled within
each sandbox without involvement of a monitor. While
monitors must be trusted, they are rarely accessed and
have a small code base. Moreover, using technologies
such as Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (TXT), it
is possible to enforce safety of the monitors themselves.
See http://questos.github.com for more information.
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VII. APPENDIX
Quest-V is designed to be robust against software
faults that could potentially compromise a system kernel.
As long as the integrity of one sandbox is maintained it
is theoretically possible to build a Quest-V multikernel
capable of recovering service functionality online. This
contrasts with a traditional system approach, which may
require a full system reboot if the kernel is compromised
by faulty software such as a device driver.
Although fault detection mechanisms are not necessar-
ily straightforward, faults are easily detected in Quest-V
if they generate EPT violations. EPT violations transfer
control to a corresponding monitor where they may be
handled. More elaborate schemes for identifying faults
will be covered in our future work.
Quest-V allows for fault recovery either in the local
sandbox, where the fault occurred, or in a remote sand-
box that is presumably unaffected. Upon detection of a
fault, a method for passing control to the local monitor
is required. If the fault does not automatically trigger a
VM-Exit, it can be forced by a fault handler issuing an
appropriate instruction. 9
A. Fault Recovery
To demonstrate the cost of fault recovery in Quest-
V, we intentionally corrupted the NIC driver on the
mini-ITX machine while running a simple HTTP 1.0-
compliant web server in user-space. Our web server
was ported to a socket API that we implemented on
top of lwIP [29]. A remote Linux machine running
httperf attempted to send 120 requests per second
during both the period of driver failure and normal web
server operation. Request URLs referred to the Quest-V
website, with a size of 17675 bytes.
Figure 11 shows the request and response rate at
0.5s sampling intervals. The driver failure occurred in
the interval [1.5s,2s], after which recovery took place.
Recovery involved re-initializing the NIC driver and
restarting the web server in another sandbox, taking
less than 0.5s. This is significantly faster than a system
reboot, which can take tens of seconds (or longer) to
restart the network service.
Fault recovery can occur locally or remotely. In this
experiment, we saw little difference in the cost of either
approach. Either way, the NIC driver needs to be re-
initialized. This either involves re-initialization of the
same driver that faulted in the first place, or an alternative
driver that is tried and tested. As fault detection is not in
the scope of this paper, we triggered the fault recovery
event manually by assuming an error occurred. Aside
9For example, on the x86, the cpuid instruction forces a VM-Exit.
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Fig. 11. Web Server Recovery
from optional replacement of the faulting driver, and re-
initialization, the network interface needs to be restarted.
This involves re-registering the driver with lwIP and
assigning the interface an IP address. Table III shows
the time for different phases of kernel-level recovery.
Phases
CPU Cycles
Local Recovery Remote Recovery
VM-Exit 885
Driver Replacement 10503 N/A
IPI Round Trip N/A 4542
VM-Enter 663
Driver Re-initialization 1.45E+07
Network I/F Restart 78351
TABLE III
OVERHEAD OF DIFFERENT PHASES IN FAULT RECOVERY
B. Forkwait Microbenchmark
We measured the overhead of making system calls
within Quest-V sandboxes to identify any costs as-
sociated with virtualization. Using a version of the
forkwait microbenchmark [13], 40000 new processes
were forked in each set of experiments, and the total
CPU cycles were recorded. We then compared the per-
formance of Quest-V against a version of Quest without
hardware virtualization enabled, as well as a Linux
2.6.32 kernel in both 32- and 64-bit configurations.
Results in Figure 12 suggest that hardware virtualization
does not add any obvious overhead to Quest-V system
calls. Moreover, both Quest and Quest-V took less time
than Linux to complete their executions.
C. Interrupt and I/O Management
Besides system calls, device interrupts also require
control to be passed to a kernel. We therefore conducted
a series of experiments to show the overheads of interrupt
delivery and handling in Quest-V. For comparison, we
recorded the number of interrupts that occurred and the
total round-trip time to process 30000 ping packets on
both Quest and Quest-V machines. A single (sandbox)
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Fig. 12. Forkwait Microbenchmark
kernel handled all interrupts in each case. Additionally,
all ICMP requests were issued in 3 millisecond intervals
from a remote machine. Results in Table IV show that
virtualization does not affect performance.
Quest Quest-V
# Interrupts 30004 30003
Total round-trip time (ms) 5737 5742
TABLE IV
INTERRUPT DISTRIBUTION AND HANDLING OVERHEAD
Figure 13 shows UDP throughput measurements using
netperf, which was ported to the Quest-V and non-
virtualized Quest-SMP systems. Up to 4 netperf clients
were run in separate guest domains, or sandboxes, for all
virtualized scenarios. We compared against para- (PVM)
and hardware-virtualized (HVM) Xen 4.1.2 supporting
Ubuntu 10.04 guests, as well as a non-virtualized Ubuntu
10.04 Linux system, with 1-4 netperf processes. In Xen
and Linux the netperf clients were free to run on any core
of the (Core i5) processor. Each client produced a stream
of 16KB messages. Although inferior to non-virtualized
Linux, Quest-V throughput is close to that of Quest-
SMP and better than the admittedly non-optimized Xen
system. Improvements to the network stack and Ethernet
driver will hopefully bring Quest-V performance closer
to Linux.
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 1000
Quest-V Linux Xen (PVM) Xen (HVM)
U
D
P
 T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s
)
1xnetperf
2xnetperf
4xnetperf
Quest-SMP
U
D
P
 T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s
)
Fig. 13. UDP Throughput
D. Inter-Sandbox Communication
The message passing mechanism in Quest-V is built
on shared memory. Instead of focusing on memory and
cache optimization, we tried to study the impact of
scheduling on inter-sandbox communication in Quest-V.
We setup two kernel threads in two different sandbox
kernels and assigned a VCPU to each of them. One
kernel thread used a 4KB shared memory message
passing channel to communicate with the other thread.
In the first case, the two VCPUs were the highest priority
with their respective sandbox kernels. In the second case,
the two VCPUs were assigned lower utilizations and
priorities, to identify the effects of VCPU parameters
(and scheduling) on the message sending and receiving
rates. In both cases, the time to transfer messages of
various sizes across the communication channel was
measured. Note that the VCPU scheduling framework
ensures that all threads are guaranteed service as long as
the total utilization of all VCPUs is bounded according
to rate-monotonic theory [9]. Consequently, the impacts
of message passing on overall system predictability can
be controlled and isolated from the execution of other
threads in the system.
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Figure 14 shows the time spent exchanging messages
of various sizes, plotted on a log scale. Quest-V Hi is
the plot for message exchanges involving high-priority
VCPUs having 100ms periods and 50% utilizations for
both the sender and receiver. Quest-V Low is the plot
for message exchanges involving low-priority VCPUs
having 100ms periods and 40% utilizations for both the
sender and receiver. In the latter case, a shell process
was bound to a highest priority VCPU. As can be seen,
the VCPU parameters affect message transfer times.
In our experiments, the time spent for each size of
message was averaged over a minimum of 5000 trials
to normalize the scheduling overhead. The communica-
tion costs grow linearly with increasing message size,
because they include the time to access memory.
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